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A Retros pee ti ve 
on the Criminal Trial Jury, 
1200-1800 
Thomas A. Green 
My recent book1 provided an overview of the history of the institu­
tional aspects of the English criminal trial jury upon which all of the 
contributors to this volume have, tacitly or otherwise, commented. 
That tentative institutional background was intended both to stand 
on its own terms and to provide a framework for the studies on the 
relationship between law and society and on the history of ideas re­
garding the jury that made up the larger part of the volume.2 The two 
aspects of my book were joined: the socio-legal analysis and the his­
tory of ideas were to a large extent founded upon my arguments about 
the institutional setting of the jury. The relatively brief institutional 
overview thus played a crucial role. The preceding essays present new 
information that supersedes both my own tentative soundings on in­
stitutional matters and my syntheses of existing scholarship in that 
area. Little of my earlier work on institutional problems-jury com­
position and the like-remains exactly as it was before. Parts of that 
foundation have been shattered; here and there beams sag; some walls 
have, I am glad to say, actually been reinforced. In this essay I shall 
assess the present shape of the structure, following a roughly chrono­
logical approach, and, as I did in the conclusion to my earlier work, I 
shall indicate some matters that particularly require further investi­
gation. My task is to provide an overview of the preceding essays, per­
haps even to bring some unity to them, as I view them in relation to 
my own work. In particular, I shall emphasize the implications of 
these studies of jury composition for three problems central not only 
1. Green, Verdict According to Conscience. 
2. For the institutional background, see chaps. 1,  4, and 7 (sec. l); for a social 




to the history of the English criminal trial jury but also to the history 
of the administration of the English criminal law generally. These 
problems involve ( 1 )  the way in which the medieval jury was in­
formed and reached its verdict; (2) the degree and the form of the in­
dependence that the early-modern jury enjoyed at a time when the 
powers of the bench were very great; and (3) the role of the eighteenth­
century trial jury, which, although clearly independent, was, by virtue 
of the status and experiences of its members, arguably a mere exten­
sion of the bench. 
First, a precis of the institutional side of my published history of the 
jury. My earlier work suggested that the criminal trial jury emerged 
somewhat accidentally in about the year 1220, toward the end of what 
I have called the Angevin transformation of the criminal law and its 
administration. That transformation involved a shift from private to 
public prosecution and from predominantly private resolution 
through monetary compensation to predominantly capital punish­
ment at the hands of the Crown. The presenting jury, dating from at 
least as early as the latter half of the twelfth century, exercised some 
significant discretion as it determined who must undergo the ordeal, 
the existing means of providing the proof normally required for con­
viction. In so doing, it reflected, broadly, communal attitudes about 
the sorts of persons who ought to suffer capital punishment or the 
sorts of offenses for which persons ought to suffer such punishment. 
After 1220 the trial jury, reflecting similar attitudes and diverging 
from standards set by the Crown-standards that the bench stood 
ready to enforce-played a similar role. 
The trial jury's power to implement that role derived mainly from 
the fact that the bench was dependent upon the jury for information 
regarding the circumstances of presented offenses and the credibility 
of persons presented. I stressed the jury's role in the offense of homi­
cide, but I also extrapolated outward to theft. I did not deal with the 
rarer offenses of treason, counterfeiting, rape, and arson. Implicitly, I 
excluded appeals, which were still mainly private prosecutions that 
continued to come into the royal courts, although in relatively small 
numbers. 
In my interpretive overview of the administration of the criminal 
law in the medieval period, I argued that the centerpiece of the trial 
was the colloquy between judge and defendant. I left little room for 
other prosecution or defense testimony at the trial. The jury, I sug­
gested, was influenced by the demeanor and responses of the defend­
ant, which provided in-court evidence that it viewed in the context of 
what it already knew, or suspected, about the defendant, the alleged 
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offense, and the community's view of just deserts in the case at hand. 
The bench must have been aware that the jury departed from the strict 
rules of law in many cases involving homicide and theft. There is 
some evidence that judges occasionally questioned jurors, even 
pushed them hard, but little evidence that the bench succeeded in 
overturning jury domination of the resolution of most cases. At least 
in the law of homicide, legal change appears to have taken account of 
jury practices, and such change, along with the obvious willingness of 
juries to apply the law strictly in cases that the bench deemed most 
serious, encouraged judicial acquiescence in-and sympathy with­
jury-based mercy in the less serious felonies. Over time, then, the 
bench assimilated popular attitudes even while it sought greater con­
trol over a system that it could not yet effectively monitor, much less 
definitively control. 
As I formerly viewed the matter, the Tudor period witnessed devel­
opments that dramatically shifted the balance of power in the court­
room. Although some of these developments began in the later Mid­
dle Ages-most significantly the expansion of benefit of clergy and 
the investigative activity of the justices of the peace-the confluence 
of legal, political, and social change made for a great leap forward dur­
ing the middle to late decades of the sixteenth century. These changes 
involved, inter alia, the long-term decline of the self-informing jury; 
the taking of depositions from the accuser, prosecution witnesses, and 
the accused; alterations in substantive law that reduced the distance 
between formal legal rules and social attitudes; and recourse to the 
Court of Star Chamber, or to fining by the assize judges themselves, 
to discourage jury recalcitrance. The resulting shift of control to the 
bench, I argued, nonetheless had limits. Had the bench not adhered to 
the application of legal rules in a manner that at least roughly met 
with approbation on the part of much of society, it might have failed 
to have its way. Considerations of time and bureaucratic capacities, as 
well as uncertainty about gaining convictions in some cases, underlay 
a judicial willingness to compromise, perhaps in return for a guilty 
plea. Moreover, the perception on the part of jurors and the wider 
community may well have been that the community shared with the 
bench the power of mitigation and absolute condemnation. A signifi­
cant reduction in the number of acquittals and verdicts of self-defense 
was complemented by an increase in the number of convictions on 
charges that left the defendant eligible for benefit of clergy, a punish­
ment that was sufficiently modest (branding and, after 1576, the pos­
sibility of one year's imprisonment) for jurors to consider themselves 
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merciful and for the bench occasionally to resort to withholding the 
privilege from those who in fact could satisfy the reading test. 
By the eighteenth century, a much more substantial punishment 
had come to replace the sanction of branding in many cases : transpor­
tation. Although I did not explain the process in detail, I suggested 
that by then the jury had largely been "tamed," albeit in part because 
of the increasingly evident concurrence of the bench with what I 
termed "widespread community-based attitudes." Even the rule in 
Bushel's Case (1671) that the bench could not punish or threaten to 
punish jurors (except where true criminal fraud, contempt, or breach 
of administrative rules had been proved) did not often put the bench 
on the defensive. Judge and jury operated in tandem, efficiently and 
within a context wherein they conditioned each other's responses. 
Not that the system suited the needs of all parties at all times. There 
were cases-11political11 in nature-where the bench sought tighter 
control of juries but found that the everyday practices in which the 
bench acquiesced provided an argument against that control. More­
over, there were critics of both capital sanctions and of a multi-level 
system of discretion who argued that certainty and proportionality of 
punishment were vital for deterrence. Reform of the law of sanctions 
in the nineteenth century not only greatly reduced recourse to the de­
vice of reprieve and pardon, it also reduced much of the by then highly 
"managed" jury law-finding that was, I argued, traceable ultimately to 
the early thirteenth century. 
It has long been conventional to date the criminal trial jury from 
about 1220. In recent years we have learned a good deal about the 
proto-juries of the period 1166--1220 that gave medial verdicts, the de­
fendant who was thereby "convicted" being ordered to undergo the 
ordeal, to abjure the realm, or to face his accuser in combat. No one 
has contributed more to our learning in this regard than Roger Groot.3 
Groot has now analyzed the process by which, in the course of several 
years, such proto-juries paved the way for a criminal trial jury that 
gave final verdicts, the defendant thereby convicted being condemned 
to death on the gallows.4 His work allows us to draw some impor­
tant-albeit tentative-inferences regarding the relationship between 
3. R. D. Groot, "The Jury of Presentment before 1 215," AfLH 26 ( 1982): 1-24; 
idem, "The Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions before 1 2 1 5," AfLH 27 ( 1983): 1 13-
4 1 .  
4 .  See above, chap. 1 .  
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jury composition, the setting of the earliest criminal jury trials, and 
the manner in which "self-informing" came to be a natural aspect of 
trial jury process. 
Groot takes the view that practically from the outset of the trial 
jury period the bench accepted final verdicts with little question. He 
does not attempt directly to explain why such great power was thus 
posited in the hands of the lay community. He certainly does not in­
voke the traditional view that the jury was in some sense, like its im­
mediate predecessor the ordeal, a surrogate for the voice of God. One 
level of implicit explanation seems to be that proto-juries had given 
untrammeled verdicts when merely medial issues were involved, and 
this practice was then generalized to final verdicts in some natural 
fashion. At another level, the explanation may be that the post-1 220 
trial jury was an administrative expedient for which, in theory, the ac­
tual consent of the suspect was required. The bench conditioned 
"consent" by requiring a choice between jury trial and harsh impris­
onment (what became the infamous peine-not prisone-forte et 
dure) and then induced consent to trial by hundredors and members 
of the four neighboring vills by forcing nonconsenting suspects to be 
tried by the hundredors and a body of knights. Thus the authorities 
achieved nearly universal consent to trial by jury by establishing the 
more attractive local jury as the common means of proof. It was, in 
fact, the most logical candidate, for its members-at least those from 
the vills-were the best informed both about the offense charged and 
about the suspect's reputation generally. Presumably the hundredors, 
who had presented the suspect in the first place and who were men of 
higher standing with less investment in the interests-and preju­
dices-of the local community, would minimize the possibility of 
frivolous acquittal or conviction. 
From the evidence Groot has marshaled, it appears that at the very 
outset the jury was forced on persons who were strongly suspected of 
serious offenses: the use of the jury, Groot shows, must be seen in re­
lation to the extraordinary royal order of 12 19.5 A substantial number 
of the first persons to be tried by jury, being among the most serious 
offenders, were thus convicted, a circumstance that may have made 
jury trial all the more attractive to the authorities. As jury trial came 
to be the standard method of trial, however, defendants of all sorts put 
their lives upon the country, with-we might now think-predictable 
results. Jury trial very soon became a test of popular views on life and 
death that imperfectly mirrored the more abstract "letter of the law." 
5. See above, chap. 1, text at n. 21 .  
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To the extent that Groot distinguishes knights, substantialhundred­
ors, the vill reeve, and men from the vill, he writes about jury com­
position and the relationship between that composition and the na­
ture of trial. Representatives of the vill came to play a crucial role: 
their assent was typically required for a conviction. This should not 
blind us to the fact that such persons had long played a significant role 
in providing the evidence upon which presentments were based; 
doubtless, hundred jurors (presenters) did not translate the general 
suspicion they were bound to report into their own strong suspicion 
(which was required for trial to proceed, whether by ordeal or, later, by 
trial jury) without some confirmation from representatives of the lo­
cale of the offense. The importance of the local community in the 
administration of the criminal law thus pre-dated the trial jury, the 
adoption of which ought to be understood as a continuation and en­
hancement of traditional practices, not as a revolutionary step.6 
How well was the bench positioned to see what lay behind a trial 
jury conviction or acquittal, and to what extent did the jury dominate 
the production of evidence? My own account of the way juries domi­
nated trials in the Middle Ages probably overstates the matter. 7 There 
must have been some, perhaps many, cases in which inculpatory evi­
dence came forward during proceedings at the eyre. Local officials 
were present, including the vill reeves, who subsequently served on 
early trial juries. But their main duty was to report to hundred juries, 
who were in turn questioned by the bench, and the hundredors were 
in a position to relate who was suspected and then to confirm or to 
cast doubt on the charges. It is difficult to see how central authorities 
could have prevented local coloration of the facts presented either at 
the presentment or at the trial stage-how, on their own motion, they 
could have prevented either unjust conviction or false exoneration. 
6. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 4-13. Recent scholarship sug­
gests that the pre-1 220 origins of the criminal trial jury deserve greater emphasis than I 
have given them. Susan Reynolds has demonstrated that group decision making had 
long been the norm in England. Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-
1300 (Oxford, 1984). The trial jury was a natural outgrowth of this fundamental aspect 
of English political life, as was the jury of presentment itself. I have probably under­
stated the significance of the evidence regarding the use of presentment in the century 
preceding what I have referred to as the "Angevin transformation" of the criminal law. 
Robert C. Palmer has suggested that the ordeal was employed largely to determine a 
suspect's "present moral standing," not simply to ascertain whether specific charges re­
garding past acts were true. The trial jury carried this tradition forward: nullification of 
the strict letter of the law, Palmer argues, had relatively ancient roots. "Conscience and 
the Law: The English Criminal Jury," Michigan Law Review 84 (Feb.-Apr. 1986): 792-
94. 
7. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 16--20. 
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From our perspective this may seem intolerable, but it bears remem­
bering that representatives of the vills, whether they spoke for them­
selves or through the hundredors, were rightly reckoned to be the best 
informed. Moreover, they could usually be counted on to condemn 
the worst offenders, the suspects who at the outset constituted most 
of the persons who underwent trial by jury.8 
We still know very little about the transition from the earliest use 
of trial juries that Groot has explored to their later use in increasing 
numbers of cases both at the eyre and more specifically at trials on 
commissions of gaol delivery, oyer and terminer, and trailbaston.9 Of 
these, gaol delivery was by far the most common, and significant, con­
text for trials upon felony charges. I have emphasized the fact that 
those tried at gaol delivery had earlier been presented, taken, and held 
for trial (or bailed). 10 Many local officials attended the sessions of 
which gaol delivery was a part, but there was nothing like the general 
administrative process that characterized the eyre. Defendants were 
brought forward and the charges against them were read; the oppor­
tunity for testing these charges seems to have been meager, at least 
before the late fourteenth century. As before, much must have de­
pended upon the views of the most knowledgeable of those sum­
moned as trial jurors. But who were these persons, and how were they 
informed? And what does the sparse information we have on these 
points suggest about the nature of the trial and the judge-jury relation­
ship from the late thirteenth to the late fourteenth centuries? 
The cumbersome two-part trial jury of the early eyres (hundredors 
and members of the four vills) soon became a jury simply of twelve 
from the hundred in which the offense was committed. In practice it 
became more and more infrequent for those who served to have been 
among the original presenters; 11 although they were not representa­
tives of the neighboring vills in any formal sense, some probably did 
come from the locale. What little we know about trial jury composi­
tion suggests that the jury of the later eyres and at gaol delivery was 
dominated by members of the village elites. These persons were typ­
ically members of the hundred in which the offense had been com­
mitted, but they were not necessarily its leading members. They con­
stituted a kind of compromise produced by the interests of the 
8. See above, chap. 1 .  
9 .  Green, Verdict According t o  Conscience, 20-21 nn. 64--67 and sources 
cited therein. 
10. Ibid., 21-22. 
1 1 .  Ibid. 
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authorities, who wanted upstanding yet informed jurors, and the in­
terests of laymen, the most substantial of whom had, to be blunt, bet­
ter things to do. 
Bernard McLane's focus on the special trailbaston proceedings of 
1328 allows a glimpse into community processes that research into 
the gaol delivery records usually does not.12 The 1328 proceedings in­
volved both an elaborate presentment stage and the trials of those pre­
sented persons who volunteered themselves or were taken by force. 
Because the sessions were ad hoc and were held to deal with what was 
thought to be a crisis in public order, the presentments focused on 
common malefactors, persons whose misdeeds were numerous and 
notorious. McLane concludes that many offenses were thus strained 
out-settled at the local level. If so, this sheds important light on the 
latitude that presenters had. As to those charges that did go forward, 
McLane's comment that presentment was itself a form of punish­
ment is apt, for it helps to explain the high rate of acquittal by trial 
juries. 13 
By 1328 the separation between presenters (the later grand jury) and 
trial jurors was well advanced but by no means completed. The former 
were of decidedly higher status than the latter. The trial jurors, how­
ever, included a sufficient number of members of the gentry or of pub­
lic officials (approximately 25 percent) to allow the inference that 
most trial jurors were at least substantial freemen; that is, they were 
drawn from the groups that came to be called the yeomanry. John Post 
confirms the fact that at late-fourteenth-century gaol deliveries most 
jurors "came from a broad band in the middle classes of society."14 
More important, however, is the finding that trial jurors did not 
often come from the "scene" of the offense, a finding echoed in Post's 
and Edward Powell's essays. McLane locates those jurors he has been 
able to trace as living anywhere from at the scene of the crime to ten or 
more miles distant. A very large number lived from five to nine miles 
away. But most juries included at least two persons who came from 
the scene or from no more than three miles away, and most jurors 
came from within the administrative unit and were, I would venture, 
people with access to the local officials responsible for hearing com­
plaints and taking preliminary steps toward the final stage of present­
ment. I shall explore this last point presently. For the moment it is im-
12. See above, chap. 2. 
13. See above, chap. 2, text at n. 76. Edward Powell makes a related point in 
chap. 4, text at nn. 75, 1 10. 
14. See above, chap. 3, text at n. 5. 
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portant to remember that McLane is dealing with the unusual context 
of trailbaston proceedings, at which presentment and trial were tan­
dem events. His trial jurors can hardly have been in the dark about the 
suspicions that grounded the presentments. The opportunities for 
self-informing were probably at least as great for them as for the pre­
senters. Moreover, for both presentment and trial the nature of the 
proceedings put a premium on the role of notoriety- most defendants 
were persons whom local communities wanted to bring under some 
degree of embarrassment or actual punishment. 
The nature of the proceedings also dictated the kinds of defendants 
who were tried and the considerations that determined the trial ju­
rors' verdicts. Defendants in felony cases probably fell mainly into 
two classes: a few very serious offenders who stood a strong chance of 
conviction and who were already under guard at the time of present­
ment; and a far greater number of suspects who, upon presentment, 
allowed themselves to be taken, believing that they would not be con­
victed because they were innocent or because, although they were 
guilty, the evidence against them was slight or the community viewed 
them as persons who, all considered, did not deserve to be hanged. 
Trailbaston proceedings thus generated a communal sorting-out proc­
ess that began as soon as the order for the sessions was announced. 
McLane's account of trial jury behavior bears significant relation to 
the pretrial stages he has investigated. I shall suggest presently that at 
most proceedings the category of persons acquitted literally for "lack 
of evidence" against them was smaller than might be assumed. In the 
case of trailbaston proceedings, it must indeed have been small if the 
process that generated presentments took the form that McLane out­
lines, as I believe it did. Even notorious felons and common malefac­
tors were sometimes acquitted for a true lack of evidence in a specific 
case, but more often they were acquitted, as McLane suggests, for 
agreeing to appear and to put their lives on the country-and, I would 
say, for thus implicitly reuniting themselves with the local commu­
nity. Bishop Brinton (whom McLane quotes) took a less charitable 
view; he stood at the head of a long line of observers who decried the 
"wrongheaded" mercy of the criminal trial jury.15 
Nor were the judges who presided at these and other fourteenth­
century felony trials wrong in their own assessment that many guilty 
persons were granted acquittals. They, too, heard the presentments 
and must have assumed that those named represented a bad lot. So far 
15.  For McLane's quote from Bishop Brinton see above, chap. 2, text at n. 1 .  
See also below, text at  nn. 5 1, 52; Green, Verdict According to  Conscience, 288-310. 
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as we can tell, however, presentments were mainly conclusory state­
ments regarding suspicions, not presentations of discrete bits of evi­
dence that were tested before the bench. The "test" still resided in 
trial jury verdicts in those cases for which defendants appeared. Al­
though, given the nature of the proceedings, many of those who ap­
peared must in fact have been guilty, some were either not guilty or 
were not clearly proved to be, and over this determination, it seems to 
me, the bench possessed relatively little leverage. Judicial doubts in 
specific cases led, as McLane and Post have shown, to placing some 
acquitted persons under guarantors, 16 but not to refusals to accept the 
verdict of the community on the question of life or death. Whether the 
judges thought they were most often faced with honest acquittals, 
misconceived mercy, or outright corruption we cannot say. 
If McLane examines an atypical setting, we must not assume that 
more common settings conformed to a single type. Post's conclusion 
that "no single or simple hypothesis" can be formulated regarding 
"the functions of the criminal trial jury" is timely17-although I re­
main convinced that real trends can nonetheless be identified. Post 
himself finds a mainly hundredal jury, so the system that Powell con­
cludes had largely broken down by the early fifteenth century remains 
intact in Post's records of the preceding decades. Jurors did not often 
come from the specific locale of the offense, however, and the process 
of self-informing must have admitted of many and varied forms. In 
some cases, Post conjectures, witnesses came forward to testify in 
court. Although their presence, when it can be detected, as often as 
not has to do with the "good fame" proceedings that precluded an ac­
tual trial, 18 the era of witness testimony was already under way, with 
eventual revolutionary implications for trial by jury. Post's exhuma­
tion of late-fourteenth-century trial jurors suggests a transitional era, 
but one in which the older traditions nevertheless affected most 
cases. Jurors of the hundred, well positioned to know of defendants' 
reputations and often of the weight that the local community placed 
on specific charges, may well have dominated proceedings. The vari­
ety of exceptions to this rule is well marked in Post's essay. I think an 
extended discussion of Powell's essay will show, however, that the 
tradition of the community-based determination of just deserts re­
mained the rule even in the early fifteenth century. 
Edward Powell's essay focusing on the early fifteenth century sug-
16. See above, chap. 2, text at n. 79, and chap. 3, text at n. 53. 
1 7. See above, chap. 3, text at n. 57. 
18 .  See above, chap. 3, text at n. 47. 
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gests the need for far-reaching reinterpretation of the nature of the late 
medieval trial and of the role of the criminal trial jury.19 Powell's re­
search also cautions against the view that there was an early-modem 
transformation in the administration of the law; the situation in late 
Tudor times, it is suggested, differed little from that of two centuries 
before. The thrust of the argument is that by the early fifteenth cen­
tury, juries were no longer mainly self-informing but instead heard 
and assessed evidence set forth by private accusers and government 
officials. By that date, if not before, the bench had the independent 
source of evidence that I have argued made the Tudor bench more 
powerful than its predecessors. There is some suggestion that the me­
dieval trial had always possessed an active prosecution, even in the 
early days, when the trial jury was also, in fact, self-informed. In such 
a view, jurors originally had two main sources of evidence, and the 
judge had a check on the jury; acquittals in homicide and theft and 
verdicts of pardonable homicide were owing in many cases to a lack 
of sufficient evidence against the defendant (especially in cases where 
no accuser came forward) and in many others to merciful attitudes in 
which the bench actively concurred. 
Although the evidence for an active prosecution, either by private 
prosecutor or by local officials, is still very sparse, Powell's specula­
tions are plausible and could lead to a new view of the trial, at least as 
it was in the early fifteenth century. We should note at the outset that 
Powell is inclined to give substantial weight to the little evidence for 
an independent prosecution that has thus far surfaced, on the grounds 
that the early-fifteenth-century juries he has studied were no longer 
mainly drawn from the locale in which the alleged offense had been 
committed. This is an important finding, the significance of which 
must be assessed with care. First, and most significantly, some juries 
had no members from the relevant hundred, although on Powell's evi­
dence this was the case for only 15 percent of the offenses. How were 
the jurors informed in these cases? Did the trial reduce itself to an as­
sessment of the credibility of the defendant, who was closely ques­
tioned by the judge, and was this assessment influenced by the nature 
of the charge? Was the trial likely to lead to an acquittal on grounds of 
insufficient evidence? We do not know. But whatever we conclude re­
garding this subset of cases, we are not driven to conclude that there 
must typically have been an active and independent prosecution. 
In most cases, county-wide juries carried at least a few members 
1 9. See above, chap. 4. 
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from the relevant hundred.20 On some occasions there was only one, 
a third of the time there were two, and in another third of the time 
there were from three to six. Powell has shown that jurors were most 
often well-established persons. Many were hundred officials, and 
most of the others were persons who had ready access to such offi­
cials. Although occasionally jurors were signed on at the assizes at the 
last moment, typically they had some warning of their impending 
duty. Two-thirds of the time, jurors went off to a delivery at which 
only one or two persons from their hundred were due to stand trial; 
the rest of the time there were three to five suspects under lock and 
key. Many of these suspects had surrendered themselves to await the 
delivery well knowing how the community viewed them. Here Pow­
ell's data suggest a degree of preformed opinion about suspects to 
which prospective jurors had easy access. None of this is to say that 
those jurors who were from the defendant's hundred must necessarily 
have come to court ready to inform their fellow jurors of the commu­
nity's view (or views) regarding the appropriate resolution; it is 
merely to say that they could easily have done so. All the more was 
this true for the slightly earlier, more heavily local juries whose com­
position Post has studied. Even if some members of most juries did 
come to court armed with knowledge of the community's view of the 
case and of the defendant's reputation generally, might the entire jury 
nevertheless have received more evidence in court? Surely, as I have 
suggested, the statements and demeanor of the defendant were very 
significant, and sometimes the judge must have elicited an all-too­
candid response or otherwise incriminating behavior. 21 Should one 
suppose as well that a private accuser or local official typically testi­
fied against the defendant? 
For the early period, some evidence takes a form that we would not 
expect it to take if formal testimony in court against the accused was 
common. 22 Thereafter, as stated, there is occasional evidence of a pri-
20. See above, Figure 4.2. 
2 1 .  Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 67. 
22. Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, ed. S. E. Thome (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1968), 2:404-6. Post correctly observes that justices interrogated "de­
fendants and their accusers to elicit claims and statements well outside the formal 
needs of appeal and exception" (citing Placita Carone, ed. J. M. Kaye, Selden Society 
Supplementary Series, 4 [ 1966], 8-9, 15-22). See above, chap. 3, text at n. 40. It is im­
portant to emphasize that the instances in which this occurred were cases brought on 
appeal, not on indictment. In the latter cases, the bench interrogated the defendant be­
fore seeking the verdict of a jury, but no principal accuser or witnesses are mentioned. 
No doubt the procedure used in appeals (a small minority of cases) was a significant 
source of the procedure that eventually emerged in trials upon indictment (the great 
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vate accuser, but not much more. Altogether, there is too little yet for 
us to say very much. But, admittedly, this is mainly due to the state 
of the extant record. It is perhaps unsound to conclude in either direc­
tion. Rather, let us accept, for the sake of argument, the possibility of 
in-court prosecution testimony in the later Middle Ages and hypoth­
esize about its nature and its likely effects. Our central question is, of 
course, how far does the presence of in-court testimony require a re­
vision of the view that the medieval criminal trial jury typically ex­
ercised very substantial power over the resolution of cases? 
It is important to keep in mind that the opportunity for self-inform­
ing was always present in the Middle Ages. We are not discussing a 
mythical beast. Powell himself asserts that as late as the early fif­
teenth century some jurors in some cases were still self-informed. 
The question he seems to be asking is whether they were still (or ever 
had been) solely self-informed. The evidence set forth by Groot, 
Mclane, and Post is not, I suppose, inconsistent with the possibility 
of in-court prosecution testimony alongside self-informing, but that 
evidence-and the evidence adduced by Powell as well-does make it 
appear that self-informing was at the very least one inevitable and sig­
nificant aspect of the medieval trial. In many instances, trial jurors 
simply could not have avoided knowing something about the com­
munity's view of events, parties, and appropriate results, and even of 
the credibility of specific claims. Many trial jurors in the early period 
had served as presenters in the same case; moreover, throughout the 
entire period jurors who were leading community figures (including 
officials) were bound to know a good deal about offenders held for 
trial. There was no requirement that jurors banish such things from 
their minds-quite the opposite. Jury self-informing was a lawful fact 
of legal life. 
How ought one to think about testimony for the prosecution in the 
later Middle Ages alongside self-informing? To begin with, it is not 
yet certain that local officials were called upon to testify in court, be­
yond stating what formal charges had been laid against the accused. 
With the exception of some coroners' rolls, their rolls and memoranda 
rarely record the results of investigations, over and above the formal 
charges made before them, charges that were the basis for present­
ments and that remained a check on the level and kind of offense for 
which a defendant had been held for trial. This is not to say that such 
local officials ( constables, hundred-bailiffs, coroners) did not possess 
majority of cases). But there are few, if any, signs that this latter development had taken 
place as of the time of Placita Carone !the mid to late thirteenth century). 
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useful information. By the time of the trial they probably knew a fair 
amount. But what they knew may have been, for example, the fact 
that the accusing parties were still furious or, conversely, that they 
were prepared to make a settlement; it may have been mainly a mat­
ter of the suspect's reputation generally and of the community's view 
about the "appropriate" resolution of a trial for life or death. It is my 
guess that if local officials testified, it was this kind of knowledge that 
structured their testimony. If they served as jurors, they gave their 
verdicts on a similar basis. Powell has suggested that one reason for 
the high acquittal rate even as late as the fifteenth century was the 
large number of cases in which there was insufficient evidence.23 No 
doubt that is true. But it might well be the case that much of the time 
the conclusion "insufficient evidence" was a result of communal 
processes and not, as it were, an objective fact. If local officials did tes­
tify, what they said they "knew"-how certain they said they were 
about the truth of charges-was a reflection of the kind of filtering 
process that would be hidden from the bench and that I have attrib­
uted to verdicts rendered by jurors.24 If such officials did testify, that 
is, they probably behaved largely as they did when they served-and 
Post and Powell show they did serve-as jurors. 
We should not, however, overlook the possibility that local officials 
sometimes spoke with candor in court, even in cases where that can­
dor required setting forth testimony that threatened the outcome that 
the local community had, through informal processes, agreed upon. 
Especially from the late fourteenth century on, increasing investiga­
torial activities by justices of the peace and their inferior officers prob­
ably created a relatively non-local source of pressure that placed the 
local official, in the courtroom, in a bind between his duties to the 
Crown and his role in the community.25 Ultimately, it may have been 
23. See above, chap. 4, text at nn. 1 1 8-19. 
24. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, chap. 2. 
25. The tension I am referring to is, of course, not merely a function of the 
pressure brought to bear by a "relatively non-local" justice of the peace upon "rela­
tively local" village officials. Within most local areas there probably were significant 
differences of opinion between social groups--and even within such groups--regarding 
the resolution of disputes involving criminal offenses. It is important to recognize, 
however, that I am not denying that local communities were frequently divided on all 
sorts of questions, that for many purposes there was simply no "community" in the 
sense of a unified, or even general, community of opinion. What I am suggesting is that 
there was relatively widespread consensus regarding the question of life or death, that 
at the least there were some cases so serious (or offenders so nasty or untrustworthy) 
that death was generally deemed to be deserved and others so trivial (though capital un­
der the law) that death was generally deemed unwarranted. In some cases, perhaps 
many, there were conflicting views. In some of these cases, the conflicts were worked 
Eleven Thomas A. Green 
372 
a recognition of the pressures of localism that led the Crown to place 
so much emphasis upon early intervention by the justices of the peace 
and upon the recording of statements from all the parties concerned. 
This practice, combined with the real decline of the local, self-in­
formed jury (whenever it ultimately came about), constituted the 
transformation of early-modem criminal administration. Its source, 
but not its mature manifestation, is plainly visible by the early fif­
teenth century. 
Even in Smith's day ( 1 560s) the vitality of the system of prosecution 
seems to have depended upon in-court testimony of the accuser­
victim and his supporting witnesses, not of officials-at least, so far as 
one can tell from either Sir Thomas's perhaps muddled account or 
from later depictions of felony trials.26 What made the system so rel­
atively powerful by Smith's day was the writing down of both the 
charges and the evidence (circumstances, reasons for beliefs, and 
other evidence), immediately after the commission of an offense, and 
the accused's story, probably given as soon as he was taken and before 
he had heard his accuser's account. This is the kind of information 
that allowed the Tudor bench a substantial advantage vis-a-vis what 
was by then clearly a non-local, non-self-informed jury.27 
Assuming that by the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries 
accusers did often testify in court, their testimony may have consti­
tuted a relatively weak form of the prosecution that was common by 
late Tudor times. The accused's sang-froid in denying complicity, 
when it was in fact a dishonest denial, must have been much greater 
when he or she faced a local jury (or even a jury upon which only one 
or two local persons of substance sat) and knew that the local com­
munity took a relatively benign view of the case. (This last point-the 
defendant's knowledge of the community's view-is significant and 
not unfairly posited, for it is, quite reasonably, one of Powell's as­
sumptions concerning the reasons why many defendants made them-
out before trial, but in others they were not. I am conjecturing that pressure from 
"above" and outside the local community (in the form of the activities of justices of the 
peace) may sometimes have induced local officials to behave as though there were no 
consensus in the defendant's favor when in fact there was and, a fortiori, not to lean in 
the defendant's favor when there was no such consensus. I have consistently retreated 
to general tendencies, even though in particular cases the specific facts were of great 
importance, because I have sought to identify those trends that were sufficiently strong 
that they had an impact on, for example, typical jury behavior, dominant judicial per­
ceptions of that behavior, and the "community's" general understanding of what it was 
appropriate for jurors to do. 
26. T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. M. Dewar (Cambridge, 1982), 
1 10-16; Old Bailey Sessions Papers, passim. 
27. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, chap. 4. 
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selves available for trial at gaol delivery. )28 And even an accusation 
that carried some force and was parried by only the weakest kind of 
denial was still a matter for the jury to resolve. So long as even a subset 
of the jury was composed of substantial local people on oath to sort 
out the weak accusations from the strong, the well-meant but "mis­
taken" ones from the convincing ones ("insufficient evidence" again), 
there was, more than just in theory, a body of "evidence" on credibil­
ity and the like dominated by jurors. Their manipulation of that evi­
dence to exonerate those who were guilty but who ought not (in their 
view) to be hanged, could remain hidden from the bench. These were 
facts of life that were themselves instrumental in determining when 
victims would appeal, or appear to prosecute upon a presentment or 
indictment. I believe Powell would agree that one corollary of a rela­
tively high conviction rate in appeals was a relatively low appearance 
rate by victims in the kinds of offenses for which the community 
rarely hanged off enders. 29 
The result of all this may well have been relatively little candid and 
forceful prosecution testimony in that great range of offenses for 
which society was typically reluctant to have recourse to the gallows, 
even in the later Middle Ages. And I would posit that in many cases 
there was therefore a continuation of older traditions of hidden, jury­
based manipulation or suppression of evidence. This is not to deny, 
however, that as the bench's views came to accord with those of the 
community-or were seen to-more and more candid testimony may 
have come forward, whether from the prosecution, the defendant, or 
the jurors. Especially in homicide, jury-based rejection of those coro­
ner's inquisition details that inculpated a defendant but did not estab­
lish a case for which the community would have him or her hanged 
was no longer critical. An "understanding" bench did not have to be 
kept in the dark. Powell's suggestion that by the early fifteenth cen­
tury the judge and jury openly agreed on mercy seems plausible.30 If 
Powell's surmise is correct that by the early fifteenth century there 
was more of a real prosecution, it may be that these developments 
were interrelated. That is, we might expect to find both an increase in 
prosecution by victim-accusers in the most serious cases, where the 
community was ready to apply the law to the fullest, and greater can­
dor on the part of local officials and others (as jurors) in the least seri­
ous ones, where even the bench considered hanging inappropriate. 
28. See above, chap. 4, text at n. 115. 
29. See above, chap. 4, text at nn. 76, 77. 
30. See above, chap. 4, text at n. 123. 
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But all this remains a matter of conjecture. On the main point that 
Powell has raised, one must concede the possibility of a different kind 
of trial in a substantial number of cases by at least the later Middle 
Ages from the one I posited in my book as nearly universal virtually 
until Tudor times.31 One must grant, too, that the "transformation" 
of the trial began earlier and moved more glacially than I suggested. 
Indeed, having earlier put my case in the strongest terms, I should 
now restate it in the weakest form, giving the new evidence both 
proper respect and room for growth and according the unknowable the 
caution that is its due. 
Throughout much of the medieval period, we ought to conclude, the 
jury was at least in large part self-informing, and it frequently domi­
nated the gathering and setting forth of evidence, especially in simple 
homicide and nonaggravated theft. There was a sufficiently large 
body of such cases for a tradition of nullification of the law by juries 
to develop, one that the bench recognized but was typically unable to 
prevent in specific cases. Over time the distance between judge and 
jury lessened with regard to the treatment of such cases, if, indeed, 
there ever had been real disagreement rather than a community-based 
fear of disagreement that conditioned the jurors' manipulation of the 
facts, lack of candor, or reliance upon "insufficiency of evidence." Ju­
dicial concurrence in such cases was to some extent the result of legal 
change that took account of jury behavior, but it also reflected the 
bench's realization that the jury acted with severity in many of the 
most serious cases. Nonetheless, it was the authorities' attempts to 
ensure even more convictions in the latter that led to the increased 
activity of royal officials and the greater frequency of the submission 
of a real case for the prosecution. This, in tum, allowed for more care­
ful monitoring of jury verdicts, in the less as well as in the more seri­
ous cases. Combined as it was with the ascent of a county-based jury 
that included virtually no truly local and self-informed persons, the 
greatly enhanced prosecution augured a new age in the history of the 
criminal trial. Ultimately, more pliant jurors and the use of Star 
Chamber also contributed crucially to the power of the Tudor 
bench.32 But it is also true that this transformation (if I may still em­
ploy that word) owed something significant to changes in the six­
teenth century in substantive law that lessened the distance between 
official and popular attitudes regarding the use of capital punishment. 
The truth of the matter, of course, probably lies somewhere be-
31 .  Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 26-27. 
32. Ibid., 140-43. 
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tween the two positions I have delineated. Over the long term, judi­
cial control of proceedings probably increased faster than I have sug­
gested but not so dramatically as to preclude an early period of 
relatively strong domination by the jury. Trials were probably more 
complicated affairs than I have suggested. As Post concludes, at least 
implicitly, sometimes the bench monitored and steered the outcome, 
sometimes it was overwhelmed. The working out of a judge-jury 
agreement, especially in homicide, may well have taken place in the 
context of trials that presented only a partially "hidden" defense. The 
bench may have acceded to a merciful view of the matter even though 
if it had pressed, it could have established the "truth" and determined 
the outcome mainly on its own terms. Trials were not only more com -
pl ex from the point of view of the presentation of evidence and the op­
tions exercised by the bench; they were probably also more complex 
psychologically or, as it were, socially. All sorts of factors determined 
how each side would behave, and in this setting, as these studies on 
the composition of medieval criminal trial juries suggest, there pre­
vailed an even more flexible understanding of the law-and of the ap­
propriate application of legal standards-than the one depicted in my 
earlier work. 
When James Cockburn termed my book "one of the most uninhibited 
works" of recent legal history, he may have meant uninhibited by 
lack of hard evidence. 33 Cockburn and I have long differed in our views 
concerning the subject about which he knows most and I know least: 
judge-jury relations at criminal assizes between 1560 and 1660. In a 
lengthy footnote I cautiously suggested that Cockburn had overstated 
the degree to which the extant evidence suggests that judges con­
trolled juries at assizes, particularly between 1570 and 1625.34 More 
significantly, I attempted to shift the terms of the debate by suggest­
ing that the exercise of judicial authority was itself contingent upon 
some substantial degree of judicial acquiescence in the "standards" 
that had long been applied by the community, or at least that part of 
it represented by the trial jury.35 Of course, Cockburn and I agree that 
the bench was very powerful during this period. For the reasons stated 
above, I do believe that in the late Tudor period the constraints upon 
the jury were more powerful than at most other times and that the 
33. Ibid., dust jacket. 
34. Ibid., 1 50-52 n. 1 79. 
35. Ibid., chap. 4, sec. 2. 
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second half of the sixteenth century marks a culmination in the 
growth of the authority of the bench, as that authority was exercised 
in criminal trials at assizes. The issue between us has been, as is often 
the case, a matter of degree-but a matter of degree that matters. 
Cockburn has now both strengthened the argument for the relative 
passivity of juries in the period 1560-1590 and conceded an increase 
in jury initiative thereafter. He has also made an important contribu­
tion to the history of the criminal law through his demonstration that 
jury composition, and probably judge-jury relations, underwent cru­
cial changes in the middle of the seventeenth century.36 I believe that 
there is much to the view afforded by the essays in this volume that 
the maturation of the judge-controlled trial was gradual, spanning the 
years from 1350 to 1550; that it reached a higher peak than I had hith­
erto supposed, perhaps in the very late sixteenth century; and that a 
modern era of greater sharing of power between judge and jury 
emerged fairly suddenly-rather than simply evolving out of a simi­
larly textured past-in the several decades preceding the Restoration. 
Nevertheless, much as there is to this view, and in the face perhaps of 
other "jurors" who may be called upon to resolve this question, I 
should like to hold out a bit longer before reaching a final verdict. I am 
not fully convinced that jury passivity was ever anything like abso­
lute. I am still inclined to the view that the "community" constituted 
a significant constraint upon judicial authority with respect to the 
administration of the criminal law even during the half century 
(roughly 1550 to 1600) still in dispute. 
In part Cockburn and I view the late Tudor period with differing per­
spectives on what counts as the exercise of authority, and in part we 
are asking different questions. Where the bench prevented jury control 
of the outcome through a form of overruling of the verdict, Cockburn 
rightly sees judicial power and jury ineffectuality. But I see jury proc­
ess as less than fully controlled and wonder whether the lesson 
learned is that the jury must not disagree with the bench, or that jury 
disagreement, although "allowed," may sometimes be subsequently 
frustrated by the bench. Where Cockburn rightly sees judicial avoid­
ance of the use of the jury, I infer a living awareness, and fear, of po­
tential jury independence. Where Cockburn rightly sees judicial steer­
ing of jury resolutions that do not strictly accord with the letter of the 
law, I wonder whether one result might have been the jurors' self-in­
terested assumption that they shared the power of discretion.37 In-
36. See above, chap. 6. 
37. See above, chap. 6, text at n. 93. Cockburn, Assize Introduction, 13 1-33. 
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deed, I suspect that the bench fostered that very assumption, so far as 
it believed that doing so would enhance the administration of the law 
without undermining ultimate judicial control. I do not know how 
often the bench lost its bet on this risky device, but I doubt that it al­
ways won it. 
We are only now coming to understand the nature of jury composi­
tion in the middle period, especially in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. Peter Lawson's work, which roughly comple­
ments the assumptions about jury composition of some other schol­
ars, notably Cynthia Herrup, suggests that the later-Elizabethan and 
Jacobean trial juries drew heavily upon the yeomanry at the assizes 
and (here there is general agreement with Stephen Roberts) upon 
lesser yeomen and even husbandmen at quarter sessions.38 Lawson 
rightly emphasizes that, in the main, jurors were drawn from the 
elites of England's villages. These were men who, in national terms, 
may be described as of the middling sort, but they stood closer to the 
top of society than that term suggests (certainly closer than I earlier 
suggested). 39 As Lawson admits, the evidence he has been able to mus­
ter with respect to the wealth of jurors is sparse, and our conclusions 
on the recruitment of jurors from the upper reaches of the yeoman 
class must remain tentative. Jurors were propertied, but they were not 
all farmers; men of small commerce-artisans and tradesmen-were 
among their ranks. From a local perspective they were, of course, of 
high status. Although they were not county leaders, they were none­
theless leaders of village society, persons upon whom much of English 
governance had devolved. Beholden in a sense to the sheriff, the jus­
tices of the peace, and others who exercised the power of selection, 
these men were, I would suggest, beholden also to the hundreds in 
which they dwelled and which they helped to govern. 
Keith Wrightson has shown how this order both governed the base 
of the population and mediated between it and higher orders.40 They 
had to live among those whose disputes they helped to resolve, and 
the resolution through jury verdicts at assizes was only one of many 
forms of intercession they were called upon to practice. It would be 
38. See above, chap. 5; Cynthia B. Herrup, The Common Peace: Participa­
tion and the Criminal Law in Seventeenth-Century England I Cambridge, 1 987), chap. 
6. On Roberts, see above, chap. 7. 
39. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 133 and n. l l  l .  
40. Keith Wrightson, "Two Concepts of Order: Justices, Constables, and Ju­
rymen in Seventeenth-Century England," in An Ungovernable People: The English 
and Their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. J. Brewer and J. Styles 
1 1980), 2 1-46. 
Eleven Thomas A. Green 
378 
incautious to view this order as being able with impunity to impose 
standards for which communal support was lacking upon the local 
community-or, if in some sense able to do so, as being so inclined. 
Lawson rightly calls attention to the instrumental role the yeomanry 
played in many aspects of local governance,41 a role that-I would 
conjecture-conditioned them to understand and acquiesce in the 
standards of the respectable poor, who were frequently the victims of 
theft or physical assault. 
It was this yeoman class that inherited the duties of the local con­
stables and hundred elites whom Powell found serving on early-fif­
teenth-century juries. Their circumstances differed, however, from 
those of their medieval ancestors. As central authority reached down 
more pervasively into local life, the village elites came under greater 
pressure from above. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the 
gulf between rich and poor widened,42 local elites identified more 
commonly with the county leadership, and the central authorities 
sought to rest governance, including assize jury duty, upon the more 
substantial of these yeomen, even upon some from among the gentry 
itself. Our glimpse into this world through Lawson's and Cockburn's 
research suggests that the resettlement of jury duty had begun to take 
place in the decades before the Puritan Revolution; the sharp increase 
in serial service and the regularization of the "office" of foreman al­
low us to identify a kind of watershed in the years around 1 650.43 
Throughout this period the yeomanry remained dominant, and even 
its lesser figures occasionally played a prominent role. At the same 
time, however, authorities were severely limiting the number of per­
sons who would be called to serve, thereby making it possible to se­
cure jurors of higher status and greater experience-and perhaps ones 
who better understood, and more readily accepted, the judicial per­
spective. 
Cockburn and Lawson nonetheless see the world of pre-Revolution 
criminal administration differently. For Cockburn, lesser men-es­
pecially less experienced men-meant greater judicial control, and a 
less regularized system of jury service meant far more frequent re­
course to the tales.44 Lawson depicts Elizabethan and Jacobean Hert­
fordshire jurors as accustomed to governance in their locales, even if 
they were less experienced as assize jurors than their later counter-
41 .  See above, chap. 5, text at nn. 80--85. 
42. J. A. Sharpe, Crime in Early Modern England, 1 550-1 750 ( 1984), 91 . 
43. See above, chap. 6, text at nn. 47-76. 
44. See above, chap. 6, text at nn. 16-24. 
A Retrospective 
379 
parts. He finds little evidence of the use or the tales.45 Moreover, Law­
son emphasizes the independence jurors retained in this period, al­
though he would agree that their natural inclinations led jurors to be 
severe where the bench, too, would have been so. Cockburn, Lawson, 
and I are all in agreement on this last point, and I would stress the im­
portance of the fact that much of society-even England's husband­
men and laborers-was prepared to have done with truly nasty of­
fenders. It was this community of agreement on the most serious 
cases that had from earliest times, I argued in my book, made reliance 
upon local elites-a middling class in national terms-both possible 
and desirable. 46 
It remains unclear just how far assize judges bothered to steer jurors 
in cases on which general social agreement was less firm. Cockburn's 
case is persuasive to a point, but the pattern of verdicts suggests a de­
gree of jury-based resolution, which is a body of evidence that Lawson 
emphasizes.47 It remains my view that judges were aware of and as­
similated these standards, so that even when they led juries they were 
often moving toward goals jurors saw as their own, and that the proc­
ess of steering was thereby partly invisible to jurors and the observing 
public. That "public," moreover, must be viewed as wider than that 
in attendance at assizes; it included as well persons from the local 
communities to which those offenders who were not singled out for 
the most severe-and exemplary-punishment returned.48 We shall 
probably never know for certain whether their neighbors attributed 
their narrow escape to judge or jury, or both. But I am inclined to think 
that some semblance prevailed of a tradition (that is, a community­
based impression) of the jury's right to share in the power of mitiga­
tion. 
Finally, Lawson's point that we ought not to make too much of the 
concept of mercy is important.49 Juries could, in the first place, exer­
cise great severity. And often where they acquitted or rendered partial 
verdicts they were responding to the degree of seriousness of an of­
fense in a matter-of-fact way. Whether they had a subjective sense of 
acting out of mercy is more difficult to say. Lawson gives weight to 
the high standard of proof required by both the bench and the jurors 
(at least in cases where rank prejudice did not intervene), although he 
45. See above, chap. 5, text at n. 43. 
46. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 99, 102. 
47. See above, chap. 5, text at nn. 151-65. 
48. See above, chap. 5, text at n. 95. 
49. See above, chap. 5, text at nn. 1 63-65. 
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pays greater attention to the influence upon bench and jurors of the 
character of the offender and the nature of the offense. so These were 
not, of course, entirely separate phenomena: where the offense was 
capital but of a less serious variety (or where the offender was a recid­
ivist) the standard was higher, and vice versa. Whether jurors thought 
in terms of the offense, as such, rather than self-deludingly in terms of 
a constant standard of proof, we cannot say. I shall return to this im­
portant point. 
The selection process that Lawson describes-and that links his 
work to much of the scholarship on the late-seventeenth- and eight: 
eenth-century criminal trial jury-may well have appeared differently 
to different observers. Some eighteenth-century legal writers char­
acterized jurors as too merciful;s1 so, too, did Lambard in the period 
with which Lawson is concerned.s2 Moreover, the view from below 
may have been more complicated than the several essays on the early 
modern period in this volume suggest. Accusers and defendants, as 
well as the laboring poor of the local communities from which these 
participants came, no doubt internalized the message of the gallows 
ritual. Property was, after all, sacrosanct. But they also formed some 
understanding of the process by which defendants were spared: lives, 
too, held value, and the ritual of correction might involve forgiveness 
and reacceptance into the community of the living. From one perspec­
tive, as Lawson suggests, the law might not have been modified by ju­
rors, whose independence expressed itself in the application of rules 
as they were meant to be applied.s3 Indeed, that is the view I have 
taken. s4 But this seems to me to redefine the law in a way that allowed 
it to be understood as a law of mercy. 
One particular feature of Cockburn's perspective on the Elizabe­
than and early Jacobean period that I do not entirely share is its im­
plicit message of the triumph of central authorities over the forces of 
localism. My use of the word community with reference to the jury 
and the people and interests it represented has been too casual. In my 
conclusion I belatedly pointed out that jury independence relative to 
the central authorities may sometimes have reflected jury depend­
ence upon local ones.ss This is a point that Stephen Roberts, writing 
50. See above, chap. 5, text following n. 165. 
5 1 .  Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 288-3 10. 
52. See above, chap. 6, text at n. 99. 
53. See above, chap. 5, text at n. 165. 
54. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 314. 
55. Ibid., 370. 
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about the Interregnum, makes with some force.56 His focus is on 
quarter sessions, which were decidedly more local proceedings than 
those held before a predominantly royal bench. It remains to be seen 
whether gentry influence over quarter sessions jurors (to the extent 
that Roberts has been able to establish that influence) implies that 
there was a similar lack of jury independence at the assizes. For the 
moment, we might doubt that the local gentry surrendered the deter­
mination of life-or-death issues to royal judges. Why should we not 
suppose that the corollary of some manipulation by hundred or county 
potentates at quarter sessions was jury manipulation by the same lo­
cal powers at the assizes? Cockburn's depiction of the assizes-the 
ritual and accoutrements of the presence of royal surrogates-is pow­
erful, and his argument must be read in light of the theater that the 
assizes represented.57 It was a moment of intrusion into county affairs 
that saw county gentry look to the source of power and preferment 
that was the Crown. But court and country relations were reciprocal. 
Royal policy always countenanced a sharing of power and discretion 
with county gentry and yeomanry, so long as it was implemented in 
appropriate fashion and did not function, as central authorities saw it, 
as a disparagement of royal authority. 58 
The jury, then, even in decline, was an extension of both central and 
local interests. Its power, particularly its recourse to discretion, some­
times reflected the limits of royal influence on local politics. I do not 
mean to suggest that the jury often overtly signaled a tension between 
central and local power; I do believe, however, that the relationship 
between central authorities and local interests naturally implied 
some limits upon judicial manipulation of the criminal assize jury. I 
suspect that the reorganization of the jury in the mid seventeenth cen­
tury that Cockburn has convincingly depicted reflected a new era in 
central coordination of local matters. It both recognized the relatively 
mild degree of royal control (or the high costs of manifesting control) 
that had characterized the preceding era of court-country relations 
and prefigured later central dominance through more sophisticated 
forms of the cooptation of local elites, forms that, ironically, as I shall 
later suggest, maintained and even increased the local sharing of 
power with the central authorities. 
Roberts's work on Devonshire reminds us of the diversity of local 
56. See above, chap. 7. 
57. Cockburn, Assizes, chaps. 4, 6. 
58. See D. Hirst, Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1986), 3 1 .  
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conditions in seventeenth-century England and of the element of 
group (or class) interest that informed peacekeeping in the domains of 
England's local but "godly" magistrates.59 Not surprisingly, Roberts 
finds the world of Leveller jury theory a far cry from the reality of 
everyday practice. 60 At the same time, his study of practices in Devon 
helps to put the radical jury rhetoric into perspective, because one 
glimpses therein the source of the frustration felt by those who ideal­
ized the legal practices of the original "free" Anglo-Saxon commu­
nity. 
Here one must recognize that the Levellers and some other contem­
poraries overstated the power of the central authorities. They por­
trayed those authorities as able to exert themselves almost without 
limits in the provinces. In this way the local gentry, even when acting 
on its own interests, was deemed to be in active collusion with royal 
officials and to be an enemy of the lesser propertied yeomanry and 
husbandmen whose autonomy had vanished, so the theory ran, with 
the Conquest.61 Lilburne's was a view from the center, where the 
most important local figures sat in the Parliament that, in alliance 
with Cromwell, sought to stamp out political dissension in the coun­
ties and to maintain a tight grip on political representation and social 
and economic preferment. Digger opposition to the jury, an opposi­
tion that I have perhaps underestimated, 62 reflected a more accurate 
understanding of the interests that controlled provincial civil and 
criminal trial proceedings. 
The Diggers, too, opposed the central government, but they had no 
illusions about the prospects for local democracy. Roberts's focus on 
the problem of nonconformity further exposes the absence of total 
overlap between central and local perspectives and the relatively free 
hand of local potentates on their own turf.63 Such cases may have been 
particularly attractive-and misleading-to Leveller leaders, whose 
unyielding opposition to the central authorities may once again have 
diverted their attention from the undemocratic local conditions that 
paradoxically guaranteed effective resistance by the provinces. But 
the main point, as I have suggested, is that no matter how great the 
59. See above, chap. 7.  
60. See above, chap. 7, text at nn. 46-49. 
6 1 .  Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 1 77-86. Cockburn's discovery 
that, at least on the Home circuit, 1 650 was an important watershed is relevant here: 
Leveller complaints that jurors were being handpicked by the authorities may well 
have been influenced by the commencement of the practice of serial service. 
62. Ibid., 1 90 n. 122. 
63. See above, chap. 7, text at nn. 70-78. 
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distance between Leveller law-finding theory and daily community­
based practice, Leveller views-precisely because those views were 
expressed in the rhetoric of local democratic self-government-could 
nonetheless have great force within a certain restricted comer of the 
revolution. 64 
The inferences for assize jury independence that I have drawn from 
Roberts's evidence make more understandable the collision between 
such royal justices as Hyde, Twysden, and Kelyng and gentry-con­
trolled grand and trial jurors, both in nonconformity cases and in rou­
tine felonies.65 In the early 1 660s at least, royal judges occasionally 
vied with local men of power, and I see no reason to suppose that this 
was a novel or exceptional event (although the lengths to which the 
Restoration bench went in order to resolve the tension probably were 
novel). The episode perhaps highlighted the need for greater central 
control over local juries and the limits that continued to present 
themselves to central authorities even into the era of the reform of 
jury selection and service. I have stressed Vaughan's detachment in 
Bushel's Case, a case that arose from Quaker preaching and that was 
at least in part colored by the exhortations of Penn and others to ju­
rors. According to these exhortations, jurors were to "find the law," a 
theory that Vaughan clearly opposed but seemed not to want to con­
front openly.66 A second form of detachment appears to characterize 
Vaughan's language-if, that is, one reads jury resolutions against the 
background of local interests and control. Vaughan would have us be­
lieve that the issue was, at base, freedom of conscience, presumably 
freedom from all "foreign" influences, local or central. We should not 
be surprised, however, to discover that all parties found such "free­
dom" a convenient rationalization for the self-interested resolutions 
that they sought to protect from other, alien interests. In the face of 
royal authorities, local men appealed not to their own interests but to 
principles of justice. Those principles soon took on some semblance 
of a life of their own. 
The history of the jury in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
then, is the history of a struggle for control of an institution that stood 
in the front lines of many kinds of political struggle. Rhetorical dec­
lamations passed easily from one context to another; as I have sug­
gested, some opponents of the later Stuarts employed the rhetoric of 
64. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 1 86. 
65. Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 2. 
66. Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 3, 4. 
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Lilburne, although they felt little kinship with leveling ideas.67 Per­
haps that rhetoric also drew upon the claims made by selfish local 
men who put their right to determine local cases of life and death in 
the most high-minded terms. Whatever the role of central-local ten­
sions in the episode that brought embarrassment to Kelyng, the par­
liamentary censure of that royal judge came to be understood in terms 
of a true right of non-coercion.68 These essays, and similar work re­
cently completed or in progress, have begun to establish the distance 
between rhetoric and reality in seventeenth-century politics and legal 
practice.69 Moreover, this body of scholarship also holds the potential 
for exposing the relationship-that is, the exchange-between rheto­
ric and reality, and thus for allowing us to produce an informed his­
tory of contemporary ideas about the jury, particularly about the in­
fluence of those ideas on ongoing practices at all levels. 
The three essays on the jury from the Restoration to the late eight­
eenth century situate the members of the assize criminal trial jury 
among the upper orders of English society. I have pointed to the emer­
gence by the seventeenth century of a gulf between the few relatively 
wealthy and the many poor or downright destitute Englishmen. In 
this context it will hardly do to speak of jurors simply as middling 
men, for those groups were nonetheless among the more exalted of 
English society. Moreover, as these three essays conclusively demon­
strate, the authorities strove persistently and successfully to ensure 
that jurors came from that class of persons who were the cities' and 
the countryside's natural, though local, governors, men who in al­
most all aspects of political, social, and economic life dominated the 
everyday affairs of most of society. Not only were jurors experienced 
in the affairs of local government and drawn from groups that were 
used to working together, but they also came from elements that, in 
many matters, looked for leadership from, and alliance with, Eng­
land's most exalted rulers. How much a part of, or bound to, this high­
est order were they? As jurors, to what extent did they, for all their rel­
atively high status, nonetheless reflect the interests and attitudes of 
the numerically greater part of society? What can one say about the 
67. Ibid., 252-60. 
68. Ibid., 220. 
69. See, for example, J. A. Phillips and T. C. Thompson, "Jurors v. Judges in 
Later Stuart England: The Penn-Mead Trial and Bushel's Case," Law and Inequality 
4 ( 1 986): 189££. 
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class aspect of the administration of the criminal law? Our essays, and 
work related to them, have begun to answer these questions, but we 
have not yet achieved a fully unified view.7° 
At least two fairly distinct emphases now characterize scholarship 
on the political and social role of the criminal trial jury. Peter King 
identifies the assize trial jurors as men of the middling sort, members 
of a class or group of classes that stood in the top third of English so­
ciety but, he significantly emphasizes, below and apart from the gen­
try in wealth, office, outlook, and manners.71 King views the middling 
order as having its own interests. Nevertheless, to some extent he sees 
its members as reflecting attitudes shared by those below as well as 
above them, depending upon the issue at hand. Douglas Hay, in the 
essay published here (more distinctly perhaps than in his earlier 
work), situates the jurors about where King does in terms of wealth 
and background, but portrays them as more prosecution-oriented, as 
less prone to empathize with those below them who were tried at the 
assizes. 72 Beattie's detailed essay on the trial jurors of late-seven­
teenth-century London demonstrates that the economic status of 
these jurors was substantially higher than that of persons who served 
on the provincial (Surrey and Sussex) juries he studied earlier.73 He 
characterizes the status of provincial jurors in terms that accord with 
King's evidence, but he emphasizes the broad agreement between 
judge and jury. It appears to be his view that the justice meted out at 
provincial assizes reflected the attitudes of at least the top third of so­
ciety. Beattie draws no conclusions about the justice meted out at 
London trials, but his characterization of London trial jurors suggests 
that it reflected the views of persons immediately below the small 
aristocratic elite. 74 Although in Beattie's view London emerges as an 
exception, it is an exception of great importance, both because of Lon­
don's influence on the development of English criminal administra-
70. For a review of the literature on the eighteenth century generally, see 
Joanna Innes and John Styles, "The Crime Wave: Recent Writing on Crime and Crimi­
nal Justice in Eighteenth-Century England," fournal of British Studies 25 ( 1 986): 380-
435. 
7 1 .  See above, chap. 9. 
72. See above, chap. 10, and D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal 
Law," in Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England, ed. 
Hay et al. (Harmondsworth, 1 975), 1 7-63. 
73. See above, chap. 8, and Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 378-89. 
74. Beattie shows, however, that London jurors were far less wealthy than 
London's wealthiest persons. Moreover, he points out that the groups that served as 
trial jurors in London were as involved as rural jurors in all aspects of local governance 
and were thus involved with a wide range of people. 
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tion and because of the place London trials held in the minds of con­
temporaries, that is, in what was coming to be the prevailing idea of 
the jury in trials for felony. In the end, each of these views about the 
jury possesses its own kind of truth. 
I previously maintained that the jury functioned throughout its 
long history to effect an accommodation between ruling authorities 
and a substantial part of English society.75 In this sense, I suggested, 
the jury was both an elitist and a democratizing institution, although 
I also cautioned that too much ought not to be made of the latter no­
tion: one man's democratizing institution is another's coopted exten­
sion of aristocratic rule. Here Hay and I have disagreed, at least in em­
phasis, and in my view his present essay strengthens his position 
considerably. Quite obviously, juries did not represent the entire pop­
ulation; in some times and places, and with regard to some kinds of 
offenses, they represented a relatively small part of society. We are 
perhaps reduced to deciding how often jurors had to represent (in 
terms of their perspective, not their status) how many people and in 
what kinds of cases in order to be of the larger community, as opposed 
to being above it. Do we not also need to know the subjective state of 
jurors as they went about their work? Surely we do, but is even that 
knowledge sufficient? 
Here I would resist an affirmative answer, and my reasons for re­
sisting may help explain my own preference for what I (and I alone) 
have termed the communitarian view. It will not do to define the jury 
solely in terms of the class ties of its members, or of their politics in 
the simple sense of their conscious identification with, or rejection of, 
authority. We need to know the constraints within which juries acted, 
even when they were not cognizant of those constraints, and we need 
to know the psychology that jurors typically possessed when reaching 
determinations of life or death, even when they were unaware of those 
feelings. There were instances of people and offenses-the two were 
not always related, as King's work makes clear76-for which the deci­
sion to end a life was easy; there were others for which it was unthink­
able; and there were still other instances, perhaps very many, in 
which, whether one took a life or spared a life, some translation into 
a special language of justification was necessary. Herein lay the poten­
tially competing claims of just retribution and mercy; the latter claim 
was sometimes (but only sometimes) so broadly defined as to be 
equivalent to a claim of simple humanity. Our study of that language 
75. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 374-75. 
76. See above, chap. 9, text at nn. 1 74-75. 
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of humanity is primitive, and its inaccessibility to us may lead us to 
underestimate its pervasiveness and importance. 
It is equally possible, however, to overstate the role of mercy, which 
was, in any case, only one of several significant and conflicting as­
pects of the administration of the criminal law. We must assess that 
role in the context of a harsh penal law that claimed the lives of many 
Englishmen whose crimes were produced by the rigors and injustices 
of economic life. The mitigation practiced at eighteenth-century as­
sizes was itself often mitigated: the principal alternative sanction to 
execution was transportation for seven or fourteen years or for life. 77 
Indeed, from one perspective the capital sanction was instrumental 
not only because it induced terror but also because it allowed higher 
orders to conceive of themselves as merciful even as they sent thou­
sands into long and often cruel exile. Moreover, as had always been 
the case, it was the widespread agreement that the nastiest offenders 
ought to suffer the extreme rigors of the law that made even the mod­
est form of mitigation that was commonly practiced an acceptable 
feature of the law. 
Whatever the actual degree of mitigation, and whatever were the 
conditions that made it common, the manner in which the various or­
ders of English society viewed the abundant recourse to it remains a 
complex matter. The juror class, for its part, was a law-enforcing class 
that spent much of its time and energy arranging for its own physical 
security. But at the moment of trial, and especially at the moment of 
judgment-that is, of rendering verdict-its perspective may often 
have been shaped by other inclinations and concerns as well. The 
courtroom was not a meeting room for an association for the preven­
tion of crime. Its doors may have been open to people and attitudes 
whose presence caused jurors to see themselves and their role in a 
more broadly representative fashion. In many cases the moment of 
verdict may well have been a moment in which, in an important 
sense, Englishmen acted against their "better" judgment. 
In his essay on London jurors, as in his previous work, Beattie seeks 
the roots of the fundamental changes in the administration of the 
criminal law that occurred early in the eighteenth century. Emblem­
atic of those changes was the legislative adoption of the lesser sanc­
tion of transportation. First and foremost the crime problem was a 
problem of penology, the tail of the system that, some hoped, might 
wag the dog.78 Important, too, however, was the regularization of jury 
77. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 450-5 19. 
78. Ibid., 500-513.  
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service and its settlement upon people whose judgment could be 
trusted and whose interests made them, if not outright dependent, at 
least relatively dependable. Beattie here rightly accords great impor­
tance to the conscious policy changes of 1 650, which constituted a 
turning point in the history of criminal trial jury composition. In Beat­
tie's view, the London jury system of the 1 690s both represented a 
maturation of mid-seventeenth-century experiments and became, at 
least in some respects, the model for the experiments of the eight­
eenth century.79 And it brought into the everyday practice of the Lon­
don courts the men who would help frame and inaugurate those latter 
experiments. Beattie's instinct for the accidents that create new prac­
tice and policy-and in short order, ideology-led him to investigate 
the circumstances that, in London, first delayed and then produced in­
court deliberation.Bo It would appear that even as central authorities 
were rationalizing, streamlining, and taming the potentially erratic 
impulses of the criminal law and criminal trial procedure, they were, 
unintentionally to be sure, creating conditions within which compet­
ing influences could continue to exert themselves. We can be certain 
that London jurors worked quickly, often guided by their foremen, 
and usually decided in accordance with the interests and prejudices of 
their caste. But, like jurors in the provinces, they also came to do their 
work in the heated and constraining atmosphere of the public do­
main. Bi 
Placing the status and experience of London jurors is of particular 
importance. If the typical trial jury was as exalted in the mid eight­
eenth century as it had been in the early 1 690s, what, we are led to 
wonder, must have been the composition of the special juries that 
were sometimes employed in London in seditious libel and other po­
litical cases?B2 Surely the special jury cannot have been of a much 
higher class; perhaps it was more dependable in the sense that it was 
purged of people well known for their dissident views. If so, this tells 
us something about the less-than-perfect overlap in interests of au­
thorities and the upper middling classes that typically served the Lon­
don courts. And even special juries could find against the Crown, so 
there were quite evidently limits even to their dependability, at least 
79. See above, chap. 8, text at nn. 5, 1 5, 50. 
80. See above, chap. 8, text at nn. 13, 14. 
81.  For King's important speculation regarding the impact of in-court deliber­
ation see above, chap. 9, text at nn. 164-69. 
82. J. C. Oldham, "The Origins of the Special Jury," University of Chicago 
Law Review 50 ( 1983) :  137-221 .  
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in a specific range of cases.83 Yet another point: In the pamphlets that 
debated the law regarding criminal libel, much is made of the ques­
tion of London jurors' ability. Can this criticism of jurors be well in­
formed, given their position and experience?84 If all that is meant is 
that no layman possesses the judge's knowledge of the law, the argu­
ment is understandable. Otherwise, it rings quite false. Moreover, 
jury proponents sometimes wrote about jurors as though the latter 
took part in common political discourse. Although extremely well 
off, jurors were-or were alleged to be-fairly common by class stand­
ards, part of the large middle class from which Wilkites and others of 
a similar cast of mind came. 85 In London, as in the provinces, Eng­
land's ruling elites saw the groups that yielded jurors as a class apart­
indeed, as without "class."86 
More curious still is the role that English jurors in general played in 
applying the law in routine cases of property crime. Here they cannot 
have been very far from the bench's point of view. Hay's argument is 
persuasive.87 Jurors were the employers of those who were accused of 
routine felonies, not their co-workers. They owned property or capital 
and were set apart from the masses of laborers who were called before 
them to be judged. Jurors may well have identified with England's 
highest elites insofar as they were part of the natural governing and 
property-owning classes. They were an important extension of those 
elites, whose members made law in Parliament or on the bench. And 
in some respects that law was, as Hay emphasizes, a "class" law that 
reflected existing gross inequalities of wealth. 88 From one perspective, 
then, jurors represented an instrument of centrally monitored prop­
ertied-class power. 
But provincial jurors, perhaps more than their London counterparts, 
were at the same time members of local elites who had to live with, if 
not precisely among, lesser farmers, artisans, and tradesmen, if not 
the laboring poor. They were, it would seem, people whose power over 
the less well off depended on a mixture of authority and empathy. The 
groups from which Essex and Surrey jurors-and even Staffordshire 
and Northamptonshire jurors-were drawn could not separate them­
selves entirely from their social and economic inferiors, particularly, 




87. See above, chap. 10. 
88. See above, chap. 10, text at n. 147. 
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I would venture, from the attitudes of the more substantial of the lat­
ter on life-and-death questions. To a significant degree, they were held 
in check by groups below them in the social hierarchy, and they were 
both inclined and required to satisfy the instincts of those groups for 
mercy as well as for retribution, or perhaps more accurately, they 
were bound to act in accordance with widespread expectations con­
cerning an appropriate regard for the value of a human life. Jurors, 
then, were part of a set of institutions that created a fit-albeit only an 
approximate one-between widespread social attitudes and the atti­
tudes of England's natural rulers. One would do well to pause at this 
point to ask about this fit. Why should we suppose there was one at 
all? Why was it not closer? What were the "rules" of governing that 
made the perspective of the ruling groups diverge from those of much 
of society, if one assumes, as I do, that in a special sense the latter both 
legitimated and determined the power of the former?89 
Society in general was not captured, as the legal elites were, by a no­
tion of the rule of law in which a formal theory of consistency loomed 
very large. Communal judgment had always been a complex process 
in which ad hoc decisions arose from conditions that made them seem 
natural, appropriate, of a piece. Royal authorities who came to man­
age that process in serious cases of crime instinctively (some would 
say, manipulatively) sought to purge that process of the arbitrary and 
the incidental. Although authorities in fact accommodated a system 
of justice built largely upon exceptions to firmly expressed rules, they 
nonetheless created means for articulating fairly precisely the condi­
tions in which those exceptions would apply. Social resistance to cap­
ital punishment created pressures, for example, for legal rules justi­
fying mitigation or outright acquittal on technical grounds, so that 
rough agreement on outcome was achieved even while the larger 
community and the bench regarded individual cases from very differ­
ent perspectives. Doubtless, society came to view many cases on the 
authorities' terms: the indictment was "defective"; the high standard 
89. By determined I mean limited, in the specific sense that the assize juror 
classes drew their views regarding the appropriate use of the gallows at least in part 
from groups below them economically and socially, perhaps from something like the 
middle third of English society. As suggested in this paragraph of the text, I do not 
mean simply that jurors (or those among the highest ruling elites) feared that extensive 
recourse to the gallows would lead to political conflict but that a more subtle assimila­
tion of attitudes from below resulted from informal contact such as that involved in 
the carrying out of local governance. Although such influences, of course, worked 
downward as well as upward, I have emphasized the often-neglected upward side of the 
process. I have also tried to make clear that the influences from below were partly re­
sponsible not only for upper-class notions about when mercy was appropriate but also 
for upper-class notions about when it was not. 
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of proof had not been met. In the same way, the authorities perhaps 
unconsciously adopted social standards regarding merciful treatment 
of many specific offenders. But the differing perspectives remained, 
each side thinking in its own terms about the resolution of very many 
cases. This should come as no surprise. The needs of governors have 
always embodied their own special rules and forms. 
King's research offers a significant vantage point from which to sur­
vey some of the issues I have raised. His conclusions, even when they 
are not startling, are indeed penetrating. Although they are based on a 
study of a county that was represented by solid middling, rather than 
distinctly upper-middling, jurors,90 they seem to me to hold true even 
for areas that produced jurors of the latter description. King himself 
makes little claim for a true communitarian approach. Essex jurors 
were from the local elites, and although only some of them played sig­
nificant roles in local government, they held together as a class-or 
set of sub-classes-as persons with a variety of life styles and attitudes 
that set them apart from both the gentry and the laboring poor.91 If 
anything, they were farmer-dominated, quick to condemn sheep 
stealers, used to employing farm as well as household servants, and 
ready to discipline them. This was a breed that well knew the temp­
tations to which the young were vulnerable and that could conclude 
as quickly to remove a threat to their order as to be lenient with a 
young man understandably (although not excusably) gone astray. One 
has the sense of a potentially arbitrary system, the defendant in many 
cases owing his life to the happenstance of a few understanding father­
figures on the jury. But King argues that jury decisions were in fact 
"principled," however they may have appeared to some outside ob­
servers.92 King's study makes clear the strength of the claim to good 
character, in the sense of widespread acceptance of the rules of the 
game, that the leading local orders, broadly defined, exacted. 
For whatever reason, Essex jurors came to be even more experi­
enced, although not necessarily more exalted in rank, after 1784. In a 
move reminiscent of mid-seventeenth-century attempts to rational­
ize jury service and to place the responsibility of judgment in the 
hands of those who understood the parameters of judicial expecta­
tions, Essex jurors came to serve once in three years, as members of 
ongoing entities made up very largely of the same people.93 In this the 
90. See above, chap. 9, text at nn. 18-74. 
91 .  See above, chap. 9, text at nn. 1 90-93. 
92. See above, chap. 9, text at n. 5. 
93. See above, chap. 9, text at nn. 1 1 4-1 7. 
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Essex jury system was, as far as we know, unique, but the reform may 
prove to be an accurate measure of what the national government 
hoped generally to achieve. There may have been a parallel in at least 
one of the counties Hay has studied.94 By the late eighteenth century, 
criticism of arbitrariness had become common, and crime rates were 
(or were thought to be) once again on the rise.95 The government per­
haps hoped to safeguard the existing system by reducing the occasions 
on which jurors might exercise leniency foolishly, thus maximizing 
the degree to which measured, selective non-enforcement was applied 
in a consistent fashion and blunting the charge of inexperience .96 How 
far any of this went toward reducing actual arbitrariness we are unable 
to say, but it hardly brought the charges of arbitrariness to a halt or 
disguised the fact that the root of the problem lay not with the mech­
anisms for selection among offenders but with the process of selection 
itself.97 
In King's essay we sense that the critical juncture had been reached: 
no group of jurors could lend credibility to a system of blanket capital 
sanctions to which, given prevailing social attitudes, recourse could 
not be had in more than about 10 percent of the cases that came to 
trial. The criticism of the system was simply too far advanced and too 
plausible. King and Hay note that elite commentators often derided 
jurors as illiterate, inexperienced, and of low status, and the two au­
thors rightly suggest that this perspective says more about the critics 
than about the jurors.98 King takes this point yet a step further; he 
suggests that England's highest classes had not so much misgauged 
the composition of trial juries as they had come to see the groups that 
yielded jurors as representing a force of their own.99 Although it may 
be that jurors' occasional recalcitrance in political cases was partly re­
sponsible for this view, much of the criticism was aimed at jury be-
94. See above, chap. 10, text at nn. 122-24 (Staffordshire). 
95. See above, chap. 10, text at n. 127. See also D. Hay, "War, Dearth and 
Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record of the English Courts," Past and Present 
95 ( 1982): 139, 145, 1 56. 
96. Hay notes that, with regard to Staffordshire in 1 787, it is not known 
whether recourse to experienced jurors "was on local initiative or at the suggestion of 
the assize judges." See above, chap. 10, text at n. 125. 
97. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 35&-63. 
98. See above, chap. 9, text at nn. 1 79, 193, and chap. 10, text at nn. 2, 8, 10, 
1 1, 129. It remains unclear why contemporaries not only viewed jurors as ignorant (per­
haps a class perspective) but also thought that they came from groups far lower in the 
economic hierarchy than was the case, and that officials were not enforcing the rele­
vant statutes when they were in fact doing so. 
99. See above, chap. 9, text at nn. 184-93. 
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havior in routine felony cases, and in this context the problem of class 
was perhaps of less significance. Indeed, the most persuasive and tell­
ing criticism came, I believe, not from those who thought that jurors 
were not up to the task set for them, but from those who objected to 
the task itself. 100 These latter publicists were the new breed of reform­
ers, who both criticized jurors for being too merciful and conceded 
that, given the prevailing law of sanctions, simple humanity inevita­
bly would, and probably ought to, govern jury reactions. 101 There is lit­
tle suggestion that these critics-or any critics when they truly con­
fronted this problem-thought that even the highest-born were 
significantly less susceptible to the impulse to be merciful. Even the 
bench and the Crown were said to share in the only-too-human "poor 
judgment" that allegedly characterized the system. 
The system held on for a time despite the onslaught. In his earlier 
work Hay perceptively argued that the ruling elites were blinded to 
this particular criticism (or persuaded to weather it) by the advantages 
they saw in the power of selective enforcement.102 This was, no doubt, 
one aspect of the mind-set of many late-eighteenth-century proper­
tied Englishmen. I have myself suggested that at the same time the 
tradition of jury-based mercy drew its strength from other sources as 
well, and that those who were less well placed than the authorities 
but able nonetheless to play a role in various stages of criminal admin­
istration may have viewed the institution of jury trial in quite differ­
ent terms. 103 The leaders of local communities had always possessed 
the "right" to apply the prevailing law regarding life and death; the 
jury class held that right not only from the beneficence of the ruling 
elite that presided over criminal trials but also as an aspect of its pre­
rogative of local governance, which involved managing the affairs of 
those who were, among many other things, commonly the victims, as 
well as the neighbors, of local bullies and thieves. Moreover, from the 
perspective of many of these middling men in their role as jurors (I am 
conjecturing), this process of judgment was not arbitrary and did not 
have to be defended against the new reformers; it was, because it was 
socially based, a natural and predictable process. Only when faith in 
the efficacy of this process broke down, especially among London 
100. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, chap. 7, sec. 3. This was par­
ticularly true, I believe, of Blackstone, Eden, and Romilly, whose writings were widely 
circulated and accorded great importance. 
101 .  Green, Verdict According to Conscience, chap. 7, sec. 3.  
102. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law." 
103. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 310-15 and n. 156. 
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men of commerce in the early nineteenth century, was the system 
brought to the brink of reform. 104 
Of course, as long as the government could restrict the selection 
process to those with substantial property, the highest elite's own 
perspective might emerge as the stronger of the two perspectives that 
vied for dominance in the minds of those who served as jurors. Hay's 
definitive analysis of Staffordshire and Northamptonshire jury panels 
suggests that in some times and some places, something close to aris­
tocratic control could result. He locates those who served as close to 
the very apex of English society. But again, those who served held 
places in a relatively local society and had local responsibilities and 
sensibilities. Their views on most matters can hardly be taken to be 
those of society at large, but their behavior on life-and-death ques­
tions in England's close and crowded courtrooms may have reflected 
not only elite notions but also the attitudes of much of village society. 
We must proce,ed here with caution, but it may well be that the dy­
namics of the courtroom-especially when deliberation was under­
taken in open court-combined with the tendencies produced by the 
unanimity rule further to ensure that even the most exalted jurors 
often applied the capital law according to well-understood, wide­
spread, and-where much of society deemed it appropriate-dis­
tinctly merciful standards. 105 I must concede I have overstated the de­
gree of agreement within the community that characterized English 
criminal administration regarding the imposition of the capital sanc­
tion, 106 but just how far I have overstated the case I am still not sure. 
Much searching work remains to be done, though it will have to be 
impressionistic, for, as I have emphasized, we are dealing here with a 
matter of psychology and of constraints barely felt, or felt but misin­
terpreted by those who sensed them. 
One clue to the distorted perspective of these eighteenth-century 
jurors-and earlier ones, no doubt-lies in the importance they all ac­
corded to a very high threshold of proof.107 This is itself a difficult con­
cept. I have suggested at a number of points that from medieval times 
onward the conclusion that there was "insufficient evidence" was the 
104. Ibid., 361;  L. Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law ( l948), 
1 :727-32. 
105. For King's discussion of the impact of the unanimity rule, see chap. 9, 
text at nn. 16�4, 1 72; for his discussion of courtroom dynamics, see ibid., at nn. 164-
69. My own discussion is speculative and, in its invocation of "widespread" views, goes 
beyond the conclusions that King draws. 
106. Green, Verdict According to Conscience. See also above, n. 25. 
107. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 274. 
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result of a variety of factors, only some of which we would identify as 
strictly a matter of the quantity of proof. Critics saw the "high stand­
ard" as irrational, too high by far, and they correctly explained its ex­
istence in terms of resistance to the use of the gallows, 108 but they 
often underestimated its importance to the administration of the 
criminal law. The high standard of proof and the sense often experi­
enced in close and crowded courtrooms that it had not been reached 
were crucial to the system of trial by jury as it worked for centuries. 
They allowed jurors to conceal from themselves the extent to which 
myriad other concerns determined the outcome of their deliberations. 
Perhaps the most significant of these other concerns was the reputa­
tion of the defendant, and reputation had to do not only with the like­
lihood that the defendant had indeed acted as charged but also with 
more open-ended matters of just deserts that jurors could not easily 
confront as such. 109 The high standard was a powerful legal and psy­
chological force. It was, to be sure, an instrument of justice, indeed of 
circumspection and delicacy, 1 10 a pervasive rationalization that held 
people of all orders fixed in their respect for the system and their place 
in it. It was also, however, a surrogate for the implicit understanding, 
which the bench shared, that general social attitudes regarding the 
value of human life could not-indeed, should not-be breached. It 
tended to deceive the English about the nature of their law, their legal 
system, and their biases. It produced a powerful ethic of supposed le­
gal certainty and consistency, but its true sources lay in an uneasy 
combination of responses to the needs, both downward-projecting and 
upward-flowing, of politics and social existence. 
Research on trial jury composition, as it now stands, suggests that the 
English criminal trial jury, especially in cases of felony, was domi­
nated by local elites, men who played a significant governing role in 
everyday life at the level of the ward, parish, or hundred. The assize 
criminal trial jury forged a connection between the central authorities 
1 08. Ibid., chap. 7, sec. 3. 
109. Ibid., 282-85. See also P.J.R. King, "Decision-Makers and Decision­
Making in English Criminal Law, 1 750--1820," Historical fournal 27 ( 1984): 25-28. I re­
serve for another occasion discussion of a closely related phenomenon that I believe 
played a significant role in the resolution of capital cases in the eighteenth century (and 
since) :  the tendency of jurors to take into account-consciously or otherwise-the de­
gree to which, as jurors perceived the matter, offenders had acted under the influence of 
circumstances beyond their control. I allude to this point in Verdict According to Con­
science, 301-2, 3 16, 383. 
l lO. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," 49. 
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and the level of government below county leadership, a level with 
which county officials always had to deal. When the hundredal re­
quirement broke down, or was jettisoned, county officials turned to 
persons of the same class as those who had served earlier, taking them 
from wherever in the county they might be obtained. If the persons to 
whom they turned were therefore not dependent upon the politics of 
the specific locales of the cases they heard, they nonetheless reflected 
the needs and interests of similarly situated local elites elsewhere in 
the county. The tie between Crown and countryside reflected in the 
jury was an important instrument that gave thrust to central initia­
tives and prestige to local middle-class men. Central authorities both 
coopted the latter and were, I believe, coopted by them. We are little 
closer than we were at the outset to being able to describe the power 
relationship in which judge and jury were locked. But that is as much 
because that relationship was two-sided and contradictory as because 
the evidence has been lost. 1u 
We are, however, better able to identify the main turning points in 
the history of trial jury composition. The partial outline of events I 
formulated elsewhere has been significantly modified and elaborated 
to produce a revised version that can be summarized as follows. At the 
outset, jury service was aimed at knights and very substantial free­
holders, who were expected to draw upon the knowledge of those 
lesser landholders whom they trusted or whom they could coerce into 
cooperating with them. Presentment was the crucial stage, and when 
a second, final resolution came to be made by jury, it proved to be 
dominated by those who had served as presenters. To encourage ac­
ceptance of this ultimate verdict, the Crown allied with the present­
ers the more substantial men of the vills nearest to the location of the 
offense .  Thus began the history of a trial jury that, although elitist in 
the most local context, was composed of men who sometimes ranked 
below the elites at the hundredal level and nearly always ranked be­
low those who governed the county. The structure of the eyre allowed 
for continued domination by hundredal leadership, and this under the 
eye of county potentates at gaol delivery. Hundred representatives 
were less constrained from above, but their position within the local 
elites was mixed. The county and hundred officials who supplied the 
panels increasingly relied on local officials-village constables, coro-
1 1 1 .  Joan R. Kent has approached the problem of the relationship between 
the central government and village communities in early modem England in The Eng­
lish Village Constable, 1580--1 642: A Social and Administrative Study ( 198 7). Kent's 
study provides an excellent context for understanding the role of the administration of 
the criminal law in the development of the English state. 
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ners, and the like. By the later Middle Ages, not only was the jury less 
likely to come from the hundred wherein the offense had been com­
mitted, but it was also more likely to contain members of merely vil­
lage elites rather than the grandest men of the hundred. With the in­
crease of small farmers who laid claim to a place among these local 
elites, the jury came to be identified squarely with the yeoman class. 
By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries there were 
rarely many gentry on the trial jury even at the assizes. For the gentry, 
powerful representation upon, and direct domination of, the grand 
jury had become standard. Ultimately, an important social distinc­
tion between service on the two juries, grand and petty, became fixed; 
by the late seventeenth century there was a firm upper limit on the 
status of persons eligible (in social, not legal, terms) for trial jury serv­
ice. 
The middling groups, then, constituted the trial jury class. In na­
tional terms its ranks were small, and it sometimes included quite 
substantial farmers, and artisans and tradesmen of independent stand­
ing in commerce, although these latter groups shaded off more grad­
ually into the ranks of the lesser artisanry and craftsmen, who were 
themselves above, but not entirely separate from, the better off of the 
laboring·poor. From the perspective of the authorities, jury service by 
this middling class was appropriate as long as those who served were 
trustworthy, experienced, and inclined to follow the advice and incli­
nations of their betters. In a sense, the authorities settled for a "yeo­
man" jury that seemed to embody gentry instincts. Reforms during 
the middle and late decades of the seventeenth century stressed both 
formal property qualifications and a regularization of service, and 
they began-but only began-to undermine the dependence of the ju­
ror class upon local rather than national interests. As the rich and poor 
separated, jurors increasingly represented groups that were well above 
the great majority of defendants yet still far below England's wealth­
iest elite. The late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century jury re­
mained, to an important extent, a mediating body that was at once 
drawn from the higher ranks and still (although decreasingly) 
hemmed in by its involvement in local life. It was, as always, drawn 
from the propertied classes, and property was more and more a "state­
ment" as well as an economic and political resource. There were per­
haps differences from county to county regarding the sheer represen­
tation of wealth deciles on assize trial juries. Most often, jurors came 
from the top third or quarter of society; if some ranged into the high­
est decile, some others came from below the top third, although rarely 
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if ever from the bottom half of society. This much we now know of 
the pre-Victorian criminal assize trial jury's economic status. 
To an important degree, jury composition remained fairly stable 
while other aspects of criminal administration changed around it. Al­
though some of these changes were themselves direct responses to the 
jury, most of them were responses to factors that implicated the jury 
only indirectly if at all. Historians have associated the rise of an in­
dependent prosecution with the decline in late medieval England of a 
social organization that made self-informing possible. Probably one 
ought to reconsider this view. There was, perhaps, a potential for an 
independent prosecution at a very early date, and victims may have 
pushed themselves forward rather than having been impelled by the 
breakdown of self-informing. As I have suggested, it was concern with 
serious crime that governed the decisions of Crown and bench; their 
treatment of lesser, nominally capital offenses emerged as a byprod­
uct of new capacities for control rather than evolving as a consciously 
designed policy. Once effected, however, the elaboration of the pros­
ecution allowed in turn for the control of juries in ways that may not 
have been intended. At the same time, enhanced royal control threat­
ened an imbalance between the state and the individual that threw 
the jury's role into a special kind of relief. As self-protective and sin­
cerely believed rationalizations of its own position and authority, the 
state emphasized what had long been mainly the case: that conviction 
at a capital level required virtually absolute proof, and that the bench 
stood ready as counsel to the accused. The practice of reprieve for an 
"unsafe" verdict partially nullified jury convictions against the evi­
dence, an ironic response to the growth of an independent prosecu­
tion. Thus jury powers and their limits and the place of the jury in the 
constitution and in historical myth all owed their existence to the 
tensions created by the growth of government capacity as it pressed 
upon the once largely open-ended power of governance by local com­
munity elites. The idea of a prophylactic against government over­
reach-the principle of noncoercion-cannot be entirely separated 
from that of a safeguard against jury-based lynching or simple error. 
The struggle for control of jury ideology involved a more two-sided, 
rhetorical invocation of the right of the defendant than is sometimes 
recognized. 
In such a climate it was inevitable that multiple perspectives on the 
jury would compete for a place in the English culture's idea of the 
criminal trial jury. Further regularization and control of the jury 
would proceed upon an argument for consistency and fairness. Even 
as late as the eighteenth century, appeals to a right to find the law 
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would lay claim to the notion of a simple law evident to all men of 
conscience. To some, the jury would seem an unlearned and rustic 
mob; to others it would appear so much an arm of landed elites as to 
be a perversion of the very notion of communal judgment. Both of 
these perspectives were, of course, true. That is what made the jury so 
powerful an institution, one fluid enough in the impressions society 
had of it to weather all attacks. It was both the cutting edge of reform 
and the bastion of the status quo, and those who reviled it in one con­
text lauded it in another. In that climate, one might ask, did subtle 
changes in composition matter very much? 
Of course, changes in composition did matter. They affected actual 
behavior as well as perceptions of that behavior. The essays presented 
here not only help to establish who served in the capacity of criminal 
trial jurors, noting some substantial differences over time and place, 
they also link composition to behavior in ways that suggest how, both 
at the micro and the macro level, who sat could mean who lived and 
who died. There were, however, limits to this compositional effect. 
These limits inhered not only in the idea or ideas about the jury that 
prevailed in society at large; they resided also, and perhaps more sig­
nificantly, in the ideas that jurors-representing the jury as an insti­
tution-had of themselves. Behavior was not solely a function of class 
or status or interest in any narrow, material sense; it was crucially a 
function of self-image and of one's own perceived role in national gov­
ernance, in local society, and in the constitution. As jury composition 
altered, so too did ideas about the jury, but given ongoing traditions of 
thought, this process of change was necessarily gradual, and its im­
pact on jurors within the age-old context of the ritual of determining 
life or death must have been all the more subject to ideological fric­
tion. Perhaps even highly placed jurors unconsciously acted out a 
kind of mediatory role on a basis far different from that on which the 
authorities intended them to proceed. It is even possible that the 
higher the central authorities raised jurors, the further those authori­
ties expanded the process by which England's national elites gained 
experience in seeing human behavior from the perspective of society's 
wide and troubled base. 
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